Scientific empiricism and clinical medicine: a discussion paper! Michael Baum ChM FRCS Professor of Surgery King's College Hospital Medical School, London SE58RX 'People are conservative, biased, judgemental, selfish and forgetful. hence the need for good trials to increase their belief in what exists. not in what they might imagine' (Vere 1981) .
In a recent editorial of the Journal of The Royal Society of Medicine, Colin Ross (1981) , a medical student, stated: 'an understanding of the underlying interdependence of humane and scientific modes of thought, is a valuable asset for a clinician, since it helps. to unify the disparate science and art of medical practice'. This editorial reflected very mature thinking for a medical student; it is an expression of a bright intellect with a mind yet uncluttered by the traditional teachings of clinical medicine.
Science versus art in medicine
There has always been a clear dichotomy between science and art when applied to clinical research or the practice of clinical medicine. Molecular and experimental biologists apply rigorous scientific methodology to investigate the cellular mechanism involved in the disease process and develop animal models to mimic human disease. Whichever approach is taken, rigorous experimental design with appropiate controls are mandatory whether the experiments are performed in vitro or in vivo. Most experiments are designed to avoid random or systematic bias, allowing for the study of one variable in a tightly controlled matrix of other interactive variables. As a result of these approaches new understandings have evolved to explain human disease, which in themselves may indicate potential avenues of therapeutic innovation. It is often at this point, where the clinical application of the biological science commences, that the whole edifice may crumble with the quality of science being diluted almost to extinction by the problems surrounding clinical experimentation. Some of these problems relate to a laudable concern with medical ethics and a compassionate interest in the individual. Other constraints are less laudible such as the fear of questioning established dogma, the fear of litigation and, dare one even suggest it, sheer avarice on the part of the private practitioner.
It is the purpose of this paper to develop the argument that the same scientific integrity which is the common currency of the molecular and experimental biologist, is not incompatible with the humanity and compassion of clinical medicine, and that many of the so-called ethical constraints on clinical experimentation are merely an excuse for muddled thinking, and complacency.
At this point I hope the reader will not anticipate that I am going to be guilty of the pernicious doctrine that the ends justify the means. We must never sacrifice the individual patient at the altar of science, for the putative benefit of future generations. The ends can never be known or else the experiments would not be carried out, and the means employed can seldom be justified if they induce immediate suffering, with the optimistic hope in the mind of the experimentalist of some net gain in the future. In contrast, I intend to argue the case that the application of scientific method in clinical medicine can benefit the individual patient at the time of the experiment, as well as increasing our knowledge for the benefit of future generations.
The development of knowledge For the sake of brevity I shall describe two approaches to the development of knowledge which represent opposite poles in scientific philosophy. These are the classical approach which may be defined as 'conceptual rationalism', and the post-Renaissance attitudes of scientific empiricism.
Classical conceptual rationalism
This method of scientific thought dates back to the time of Aristotle and Galen. An hypothesis is first generated following certain observations, basic research, or an intuitive leap. Corroborative evidence is then sought to substantiate the hypothesis. Depending on how critical the individual may be, a varying amount of corroborative evidence is collected until the hypothesis is translated into a 'natural law' or dogma (in medical practice, the expression 'treatment of choice' indicates that the process is complete). There are many inherent dangers in this process, which are best illustrated by the following examples, quote.' by Bryan Magee (1973) in his delightful little paperback on the philosophy of Popper.
Having observed that all swans swimming on the lake of your local park are white, you may generate the hypothesis that all swans are white; travelling round the country you will corroborate this theory by all the other white swans that are seen. So convinced are you in your own mind of the rightness of these observations, that when you go to Australia and chance to see some swan-like birds that are black, the inevitable response is to suggest that these birds are not swans but some other species altogether. The same spurious logic applies in political theory: Karl Marx's prophecies about a utopian culture have been adopted by the so-called peoples democracies as natural laws, and if the application of 'scientific' Marxism is associated with failure of the crops or a disastrous economy, it is never the fault of the political doctrine but always the fault of saboteurs or agents of the CIA.
Coming back a little closer to the subject under discussion, this is precisely the manner by which practitioners on the medical fringe rationalize their approach. Richard Peto is fond of quoting the example of the quack who advocated mountain climbing for the cure of cancer. A number of patients with 'incurable cancer' are assembled at the foot of the mountain and assured that those who climb to the top will live a long time. Some die before even attempting the ascent, and the quack, with a sigh of heartfelt grief, will say: 'If only they would have come earlier'. Another group of patients die half way up the mountain, but they of course did not complete the treatment so could not hope to benefit; whereas a small residual percent reach the top of the mountain and may live for a number of years, confirming yet again the benefits of the fresh alpine air and vigorous exercise. This is of course an extreme example, but the human tragedies associated with the use of anecdotal evidence to support the claims of the medical fringe are countless, and the current experience with Laetrile in the United States of America is merely the latest of a long line of 'cancer cures' whose only justification is wrapped up in the conceptual rationalism of the dark ages.
Sad to say, even the practitioners of 20th century high technology mainstream medicine are often guilty, in a much more subtle way, when they abandon 'science' in favour of 'art' in the management of the individual patient.
I readily recognize from my own experience that there are skilled physicians whose judgment and therapy produce better results than those less skilled, but I would suggest that the critical analysis of these skills will demonstrate that the former readily learns from his mistakes, whereas the latter fails to recognize his mistakes and therefore rationalizes away his failures. The art of good medicine is therefore a cleverly disguised science and there is no shame in accepting this doctrine. Furthermore, if we could analyse this gentle science, the good practitioners could pass on their skills which would otherwise die with them cloaked in mystique.
Scientific empiricism
In addition to a blossoming of the arts and literature the Renaissance saw a revolution in scientific philosophy. Francis Bacon was perhaps one of the most influential leaders of this revolution. In Volume I of his book entitled 'The Advancement of Learning' he wrote as follows: 'If a man will begin with certainties he shall end in doubts, but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties'. In the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper (1959) has been the most influential of this breed of scientific philosopher, taking the argument to its logical conclusion: 'Once put forward, none of our anticipations are dogmatically upheld, our method of research is not to defend them in order to prove how right we were, on the contrary, we try to overthrow them. Using all the weapons of our logical mathematical and technical armoury, we try to prove that our anticipations were false. Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to refutation do not take part in the scientific game'. Thus the modern scientist starts off with a modest assumption that no individual, or for that matter no generation, is gifted with a complete insight into any of nature's enigmas. Progress in science is always an approximation to the truth; an hypothesis is allowed to stand as long as it is the best available to explain the observed facts. New data must never be rejected in favour of the hypothesis, but new hypotheses must continually be evolved to fit the available data.
In practical terms, the first stage of the generation of an hypothesis by the modern scientific empiricist is the same as the process that dates back to classical times. As a result of certain observations, combined with an intuitive leap, an hypothesis is created and this actofcreation must be applauded as an expression of the artistic gifts of the human intellect. It is at the next stage that the pathways of the rationalist and empiricist radically diverge. Experiments are then designed to falsify the hypothesis, not to corroborate it. It is conceivable that the hypothesis does not lend itself to falsification, in which case the scientific thinker has wandered into the realms of non-science or faith. Almost inevitably the properly designed experiment will demonstrate defects in the hypothesis, in parallel with the acquisition of new data. But again it is possible for one hypothesis to explain all observations for so long that the temptation to translate it into a natural law or dogma will become irresistible. We were all taught the 'laws' of Newtonian physics at school, but even these irrefutable laws were falsified by the ultimate observation that light may bend in a gravitational field. It has taken Einsteinian physics to explain this phenomenon, whilst at the same time accounting for the excellent way that previously observed physical phenomena fitted the Newtonian theory.
20th century neo-Galenism and carcinoma of the breast Sir James Syme, Professor of Surgery in Glasgow, wrote in his textbook of surgery in 1842: 'The result of operations for carcinoma when the glands are affected is almost always unsatisfactory however perfectly they may seem to have been taken away. The reason of [sic] this is probably that the glands do not participate in the disease unless the system is strongly disposed to it'. A little over fifty years later, W S Halsted (1907), surgeon at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, wrote as follows: 'We believe that cancer of the breast in spreading centrifugally preserves in the main continuity with the original growth and before involving the viscera may become widely diffused along surface planes'. Thus we had two mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain the biological behaviour of carcinoma of the breast. Of the two, the Halstedian concept rapidly gained ascendancy to become established dogma within the passage of a few years. It is interesting to speculate why this was the case. One explanation is related to the personality of the protagonists. It has been argued that Halsted was a charismatic character with many brilliant achievements to his credit, who spoke sufficiently loudly and lengthily to be believed. A more charitable explanation, and the one that I think is correct, concerns the impossibility of establishing an experiment in that era either to corroborate or refute the concept I have attributed to Sir James Syme. To have accepted the systemic nature of early carcinoma of the breast in the days before systemic therapy was available, would have been a policy of despair. It was therefore much more comfortable to accept a concept of a disease that was amenable to the therapy that was available, i.e, radical mastectomy.
By the early years of this century, radical mastectomy for primary carcinoma of the breast had become 'the treatment of choice'. Treatment failures were common and Halsted himself explained these away as entirely new cancers, and therefore not the fault of the surgeon. However, by the mid-1930s it was recognized that radical mastectomy only cured a minority of patients, although it was argued that this was not the fault of the treatment, but either the fault of the patient for not coming early enough, or the limitation of the operation which was not radical enough (here rationalism creeps in and note that this type of thinking is not dissimilar to that of medical quacks). As a direct result of this particular tram-line of thought, there were two consequences; firstly, there have been attempts at public health eduction and screening in order to achieve earlier diagnosis; secondly, therapy evolved to encompass wider and wider areas, either in the form of super-radical surgery or by the addition of fields of radical radiotherapy to the conventional Halsted mastectomy. This even went so far as to encourage surgeons in the 1920s to carry out forequarter amputations for locally advanced carcinoma of the breast! It must be categorically stated at this point, that there was never any historical evidence that the introduction of the radical mastectomy improved the survival rate of that achieved by more conservative measures in the pre-Halstedian era (Baum 1979) . Furthermore, the impact of public health education both in the United States and the United Kingdom, stretching back over forty years, has had no noticeable effect on the mortality rates for carcinoma of the breast in either community.
From the mid 1950s onwards a series of prospective randomized trials were set up which have effectively falsified the Halstedian hypothesis, and to date there is an enormous weight of accumulated evidence that radical treatment produces no benefit in survival compared with the most conservative regimes (Baum 1979) .
In spite of this there are many surgeons and radiotherapists throughout the world who cherish the original hypothesis and reject the data. They argue that the surgery was not carried out in sufficiently perfect a way, or that the radiotherapy was not given in precisely the right direction or with the right dose and fractionation. There are even those that like to individualize their treatment, with radical procedures for some and conservative procedures for others. Curiously enough, amongst the proponents of individualization are those who advocate extreme radicalism for the earliest stages of the disease, whilst there are others who advocate extreme conservatism for the identical stage of the disease. It is surely improbable that both groups can be right.
In recent years a new hypothesis has gained popularity that better fits the available data concerning the behaviour of early breast cancer, which is merely a re-statement of the ideas proposed by Sir James Syme nearly 140 years ago. It goes as follows: in the majority of cases carcinoma of the breast must be a systemic disease however small the primary tumour might appear; the magnitude of the residual tumour burden following the mastectomy is indirectly reflected by the extent of involvement of the axillary nodes; the axillary node involvement, therefore, is not a determinant ofprognosis but merely a symptom ofthe most aggressive forms of this heterogeneous disease (Fisher 1970) . Now that systemic options of therapy are available, it is possible to set up the experiments to falsify this admittedly attractive new hypothesis. Yet again within a few years the profession has divided itself between the empiricist and the rationalist. The empiricists have set up randomized controlled trials to study the effect of adjuvant chemotherapy or endocrine therapy following mastectomy for early carcinoma of the breast. The rationalists already know the answer and feel it is entirely unethical to withhold adjuvant chemotherapy in node-positive patients submitted to mastectomy.
Admittedly there is some evidence to corroborate the now fashionable view concerning the management of early breast cancer. A number of reports from prospective randomized trials have demonstrated a delay in the appearance of local and distant metastases following the exhibition of either adjuvant endocrine therapy or chemotherapy, but to date only small improvements in actual survival have been demonstrated in the studies with the longest follow up. The temptation to rationalize these somewhat disappointing results has been irresistible to a number of the medical oncologists who are the leading proponents of this new therapeutic approach. Inevitably the cry goes out that there is nothing wrong with the idea but merely that the cytotoxic agents were not given in large enough doses or that there was unfavourable interaction between the local therapy and the systemic option (Baum 1981a. b) .
At the present time I cannot think of a better hypothesis to fit the available data, but I am prepared to accept that only a small percentage of women treated for early breast cancer will benefit from systemic therapy with the currently available agents. What is really frightening, though, is that already artificial ethical constraints have been raised that will inhibit progress for a hundred years if not recognized for what they are. New experiments need to be designed to select out the groups of women who may truly benefit from currently available systemic therapy, so as to avoid the unnecessary toxicity for the majority of women who will not benefit in the long term.
Science and compassion
Coming back to a point I raised at the beginning of this paper -is the scientific method in clinical research compatible with a compassionate approach to the individual patient? As can be seen from the above, the widespread adoption of aggressive adjuvant combination chemotherapy will benefit a minority at the expense of toxicity to the majority. A scientific empirical approach would allow us to identify those women who would indeed benefit from such treatment and avoid unnecessary toxicity for the poor women who are doomed to fail in any case. The scientific approach would inevitably lead to the greater good for the greater number. It is often stated that individuals entered into clinical trials should not be denied the benefit of the best treatment available, yet the best for some may be the worst for others, and at the end we only see a net result. Providing we remember that each patient should be offered, at the very least, the chance of'local control of her cancer until she dies of disseminated disease, whilst at the same time progressing methodically from the 'soft' to the 'hard' systemic modality, we may one day indeed be able to individualize the treatment most appropriate for the patient and her cancer.
Problems of clinical trials
Having said all that, I would be the first to admit that there are very serious problems to be surmounted for the satisfactory running of prospective randomized clinical trials, which are the proper expression of scientific empiricism applied to clinical medicine. Firstly, there are serious ethical problems of clinical experimentation, not least of which concerns the nature of informed consent. My own attitude to this point can be summed up briefly. I believe that whatever formula is adopted must be designed to protect the patient and not the doctor. We have nothing to learn from the practice in the United States of America where elaborate formulae for so-called informed consent have been drawn up by the medical profession to protect themselves from the dangers of litigation. There has also been enormous pressure on the American profession by articulate, middle-class journalists from the feminist lobby. They claim to speak for the whole of womankind, but they most certainly do not speak for the poor working-class women from Brixton or Camberwell for whom I have the privilege to care.
Secondly, there is the problem of additional unrewarded effort on behalf of the participating clinician entering patients into clinical trials. A large number of doctors have the naive idea that progress in cancer treatment is made by a series of major breakthroughs, and that they merely have to stand patiently on the sidelines applauding the breakthroughs which are then adopted as their standard practice. I feel that this attitude is parasitic and that it is the responsibility of all clinicians treating patients with cancer to participate in clinical trials when the opportunity presents.
There is also the major problem of logistics. It is an unfortunate statistical truism that in order to detect clinically significant improvements in results of the order of 10-15%, at statistical levels of significance, large number of patients are required. To recruit 1000 patients into a study over a period of three years demands collaboration with many centres. This in its turn requires enormous logistical backup and business-like expertise. It has now been recognized that properly financed and adequately staffed clinical trial data centres need to be established. The Cancer Research Campaign and the Medical Research Council have already taken the initiative in the United Kingdom to establish two such centres within the last twelve months.
This leads on to questioning the expense of such trials. At the moment the government indirectly meets the bill for the millions of pounds that are spent annually on radiotherapy equipment and cytotoxic drugs, yet much of this treatment is of unproven worth. In contrast, a properly designed clinical trial that might cost £30 000 a year may, in the long term, save millions of pounds by an exercise in cost-effectiveness. Ultimately, therefore, I feel it is the responsibility of government rather than charitable institutions to provide the funding for these exercises.
Conclusions
It is often stated that clinical trials were not necessary to prove the value of penicillin in treating gram-positive infections. Yet it is often forgotten that over 20 years elapsed between the discovery of the drug by Fleming in 1929, Florey's first report of its use in an uncontrolled series of patients in 1943, and its widespread adoption in appropriate dosage in the early 1950s. Notwithstanding the problems of its commercial production, a series of interrelated clinical trials could easily have demonstrated the value and the correct dosage of penicillin for acute inflammatory conditions within a period of two to three years.
Coming back to cancer of the breast, perhaps the time has now arrived for a coherent approach to clinical experimentation, with doctors, patients, basic scientists, representatives of the media, the legal profession and central government working in unison, so that the artificial constraints applied to the scientific evaluation of new therapeutic departures can be dismantled. The only people to fear such an approach will be those with a financial interest in persisting with a remedy whose only justification is a reliance on the logic dating back to Aristotle and Galen.
